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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaint i f f /Appel lant, 
vs . 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CIVIL NO. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
This is an action for damages arising from the 
termination of Appellant's employment by the Respondent dur ing the 
time the Appellant was receiving Workman's Compensation benefits 
for an in iury sustained while in Respondent's employ. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellant appeals from an Order of Summary 
Judgment wherein the Judge of the Seventh Judicial Distr ict Court 
ruled as a matter of law that no cause of action existed for the 
redress of grievances arising from the discharge of onefs 
employment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary 
Judgment entered against her and for the remand of this cause to 
the lower court for t r ia l on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the Appellant in 
August , 1984 by the f i l ing of a Verif ied Complaint alleging inter 
alia; that she was employed in August of 1981 as a bus dr iver for 
the Grand County School Dis t r ic t ; that in the employment interview 
she was advised the bus dr ivers enjoyed the same negotiated 
benefits (with the exception of the number of days for sick leave) 
as the educators and support personnel of the Grand County School 
Distr ict who were represented by the G.E.A. Union; that she 
received oral assurances that as long as her job performance was 
sat isfactory, she could rely upon employment for an indefinite term, 
and she would be tendered a yearly contract each June when salary 
adjustments were made. In August , 1981 the Appellant commenced 
work and was continually assured her job performance was 
satisfactory and she never received a negative evaluation. 
On September 23, 1983 Appellant's supervisor 
directed her to t ransport chi ldren with special educational needs. 
Inasmuch as the vehicle did not comply with the minimum standards 
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prescribed by the Utah Transportation Commission, which standards 
were promulgated bv the author i ty of Section 41-6-115 of the Utah 
Code requir ing some form of mechanical apparatus to l i f t chi ldren 
into the bus, the Appellant had to l i f t manually a child into the bus 
who was wearing braces and was in a wheelchair. While performing 
this task, Appellant sustained a back in ju ry . 
The State Insurance Fund, as the workman's 
compensation carr ier for the Grand County School Dis t r ic t , 
commenced compensation for this in ju ry . 
The Appellant alleges that on January 6, 1984 the 
Superintendent of Schools told her i f she did not re turn to work by 
the end of January she would be replaced. On January 30, 1984 
the Superintendent told her he was going to let her go, but was 
going to hold her on the payroll unt i l the end of May for insurance 
reasons. During this time Appellant was being treated by doctors 
and was receiving compensation from the workman's compensation 
carr ier . 
On May 17, 1984 Appellant advised the 
Superintendent of Schools the doctor would release her to return to 
work on or before August 21 , 1984, but she was advised she did 
not have a job and she would not be given a blue slip or any 
evidence of termination. 
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The Handbook of Selected Policies and Rules 
approved and adopted by the Grand County Board of Educators 
fu r ther provided for the order ly termination procedures without 
discrimination. The procedures provide inter alia (1) the receiving 
of a wr i t ten notice prior to the end of the contract of the intent 
not to employ, (2) the r ight of a fair hearing concerning 
employment status or a r ight to an informal conference. 
Appellant alleges she was terminated by the 
Respondent (a) contrary to the policies and procedures of the 
Respondent, (b) in violation of the implied contract the Respondent 
had with the Appel lant, and (c) contrary to public policy in that 
her absenteeism resulted from a work-related in jury for which 
workman's compensation benefits were paid throughout the 
absenteeism. Appellant also alleged that such actions were attended 
by such conduct as to entit le her to exemplary damages. 
The Answer f i led by the School Board admits the 
employment of Appel lant, the work-related in jury sustained, her 
receipt of workman's compensation benefi ts; and, fu r ther the 
Respondent admits "that the policies of the Defendant provide for 
order ly termination procedures as to certain classifications of 
employees". Respondent alleges in its Fourth Defense that "all acts 
of omission of the Defendant were undertaken in good f a i t h . . . " and 
in the Fif th Defense that "Plaint i f f has, and had, no recognized 
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sta tu tory , const i tut ional, or common-law r ight i n , or expectancy 
relative to , continued employment by the Defendant", and in the 
Sixth Defense alleges that "P la in t i f fs employment with the School 
Distr ict was legally and properly terminated because of, inter al ia, 
P la int i f fs inabi l i ty and/or unwillingness to perform the tasks 
reasonably attendant to said employment, all of same adverse to 
Defendant's r igh t fu l interests, and all acts of the Defendant were 
consistent with the policies and procedures of the Defendant and 
consisted with state and federal law". Respondent denied all other 
allegations. 
With respect to the factual allegations, Appellant, to 
c lar i fy the general denials of Respondent, served interrogatories. 
In response to the interrogator ies, the 
Superintendent of schools who is the Respondent's agent, did not 
recall and, therefore, did not deny the conversations regarding the 
discharge of the Appellant with the Superintendent of Schools. The 
Respondent also asserted bus dr ivers were "classified personnel and 
as such negotiated individual ly with the School D is t r i c t . " No 
evidence was heard on the terms of the h i r i ng . 
In the Second Defense in Respondent's Answer, i t 
was alleged that Defendant's policies provide for order ly termination 
procedures as to certain classifications of employees. Exhibit A 
aff ixed to Respondent's Answer is a copy of the Grand County 
School Distr ict 's "Order ly Termination Procedure". 
- 5 -
The "Order ly Termination Procedure" sets for th a 
policy of termination of educators without discrimination and 
classifies in Exhibit B all employees not requir ing cert i f ication as 
classified personnel. It defines classified personnel and states that 
duties and responsibilit ies of classified employees should be 
defined in accordance with job descriptions adopted and published 
separately. The grievance procedure in 4223.5 (Rules) specifically 
limits the applicabil i ty to educators or students (Procedure Step 1 , 
Informal) . The procedures manual is vague as to classified 
personnel and no evidence was heard to characterize the Appellant 
and whether or not she is an included employee. 
The Respondent's general and answer and response 
to interrogatories is replete with representations of persons not 
remembering conversations, except the one conversation with regard 
to f i l l ing out W-4's and State forms. The Appellant alleges 
aff irmatively she relied upon the representations that she would 
have the same r ights as a beneficiary under the C.E.A. contract. 
Other than a general denial, the response to the interrogatories 
elicited the fact that the substance of conversations Appellant relies 
upon are not remembered as to what was said but are in some 
instances remembered as having occurred. Facts relevant to the 
h i r ing and to the termination have been put in issue by the 
pleading. 
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Addit ional ly, i f Appellant had no common-law 
r igh ts , no r ights derivat ive of contract , no r ights derivative of the 
"Order ly Termination Procedure", she allegedly did have r ights 
as Respondent defined the in interrogatory response 9. There has 
been no allegation on the part of the Respondent that these 
procedures were followed and Appellant has aff irmatively alleged 
they were not followed because she was told she was terminated. 
Notwithstanding these issues of material fact , 
summary judgment was entered against the Appel lant, stating that 
as a conclusion of law the Respondent was just i f ied in terminating 
the emplovment of Appellant for her inabil i ty to perform and that 
Respondent was entit led to a summary judgment of "no cause of 
act ion." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues of material fact in confl ict which were 
left unresolved by the entry of a Summary Judgment Order in the 
Distr ict Court are, of course, academic i f the State of Utah affords 
no protection to an employee who is protected either by tor t 
principles or by a contract in fact or one implied in law from 
unlawful discharge, while the employee is drawing workman's 
compensation benefits for a work-related in jury sustained while 
using the substandard and unsafe equipment of the employer. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE LAW AS IT EXISTS IN UTAH. 
This Court has addressed the issue of the propr iety 
of summary judgment in an action brought to recover damages for 
alleged breach of an oral employment contract in Bihlmaier v . 
Carson, 603 P2d 790 (1979). This Court held that the entry of 
summary judgment was appropriate because the oral employment 
contract contained no express terms concerning the duration of 
P la in t i f fs emplovment and the evidence (italics supplied) indicated 
that both Plaintiff and Defendant intended the employment to be at 
the will of either pa r ty , therefore barr ing Plaintiff from a r igh t of 
action from an alleged construct ive discharge. 
This case appears to be def ini t ive on this issue and 
should be dispositive of the cause on appeal. The reason it is 
dispostive is that in the case at bar summary judgment was entered 
on the basis of the pleadings and no evidence was ever taken. The 
Appellant alleged and intended to prove oral assurances of 
continued employment as long as her job performance was 
satisfactory and the Respondent, other than a general denial in the 
answer and fur ther in interrogator ies, responded that the 
conversations to which Plaintif f made reference were not 
remembered. Inasmuch as there was no evidentiary hearing and, 
therefore, no f inding made as to the presence or absence of oral 
promises of continued employment or whether or not wr i t ten 
provisions in a union contract or wr i t ten provisions in a procedure 
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manual appl ied, there are genuine issues of material fact to be 
heard and summary judgment cannot be entered as a matter of law, 
Rules of Civi l Procedure, rule 56(c) , Utah Rules of Court . 
Addi t ional ly, the case of Bihlmaier v . Carson, 
in f ra , appears to set for th the Utah position with respect to the 
employee's r ights against employers for breach of the employment 
contract. This Court held: 
"When an individual is hired for an indefinite t ime, 
he has no r ight of action against his employer for breach of the 
employment contract upon being discharged." 
This Court cited Jackson v . Minidoka Irr igat ion 
Dis t r ic t , 98 Idaho 330, 563 P2d 54 (1977) to support this rule 
wherein that Court explained: 
"An employee who is hired for an indefinite period 
of time is known as an employee at will and it is well established 
that i f he is not hired for some definite period of time he has no 
r ight of action upon being discharged," page 57. 
A reading of the Idaho case fur ther reveals that 
"The employment at will rule is not, however, an 
absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge. As a general 
exception to rule allowing either the employer or the employee to 
terminate the employment relationship without cause, an employee 
may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for 
the f i r ing contravenes public pol icy." 
- 9 -
The Idaho court used the often cited Petermann v . 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal App 2 184,344, P2d 
25 (1955) to support its position that the r ight to discharge an 
employee at will may be limited by considerations of public policy. 
The Court cont inued, quoting from 72 CJS Policy at page 312: 
"Public policy is the principle under which freedom 
of contract or private dealing is restr icted by law for the good of 
the community." 
As examples of actions patently contrary to the 
public welfare are: employer coercing per ju ry , Petermann v . 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in f ra ; retal iatory 
terminations based on malice, Monge v . Beebe Rubber Co. , 114 N. 
H. 130, 316 A2d 549 (1974); employee terminated for serving on a 
j u r y , Nees v . Hocks, 276 Or. 210, 536 P2d 512 (1975); and 
employee f i red for report ing an in jury to her arm in order to f i le 
for workman's compensation (italics suppl ied) , Frampton v . Central 
Indiana Gas Co. , 260 Ind 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973). 
The Appellant alleged the in jury she sustained was 
sustained while working with equipment that did not meet the Utah 
State minimum requirements, and having sustained such in jury and 
while being compensated by the Industr ial Commission for such 
in ju ry , she was terminated. Such conduct by the employer, i t is 
urged by the Appel lant, clearly contravenes public policy. 
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Although this issue presented direct ly is of novel 
impression in this State, Appellant urges that this Court continue 
to follow the doctrine as evidenced in the Idaho case. 
B. THE LAW AS IT EXISTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES. 
Throughout the United States more than two-th i rds 
(2/3) of the states recognize some means of recovery. Recovery in 
to r t or contract for wrongful dismissal have also been recognized in 
Alabama, Alaska, Ar izona, Cali fornia, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
I l l inois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York , Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Tennessee, V i rg in ia , Washington, West 
V i rg in ia , Wisconsin and Wyoming. Employee Dismissal Law 8 
Practice, Section 1.11, p 19. 
These states embrace one or more of the three (3) 
basic common law doctrines which have emerged since 1970 which 
permit common law actions for wrongful dismissal despite the 
Employment at Will Rule. 
FIRST DOCTRINE 
The f i rs t doctrine permits a Plaintiff to recover for 
a breach of contract when the employer dismisses the employee in 
violation of oral assurances or promises of employment tenure 
implied from a course of conduct or from employee policies or 
handbooks. The cases cited most f requent ly to support this 
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position are Tesario v . Millinocket Community Hospital, 379 A 2 135 
(Me 1977), where Plaintiff showed a direct oral promise; or 
Toussaint v . Blue Cross S Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579, 
292 N.W. 2d 880 (1980) oral promises made direct ly to the employee 
in addition to general promises contained in the handbooks; and 
Weiner v . McCraw H i l l , 57 NY 2d 458, 443 N.E. 2d 441 (1892) 
where Plaintif f sought to establish existence of a contract by 
showing general statement of employer policies that promised 
continued employment. In Toussaint and its companion case, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan found suff icient factual evidence to 
permit a j u r y to imply a contract based on assurances that 
termination would occur for just cause only. Regarding the oral 
promise, the Court held: 
"Where a prospective employee inquires about job 
security and the employer agreed that the employee shall be 
employed as long as he does the job, a fair construction is that the 
employer has agreed to give up his r igh t to discharge at will 
without assigning a cause and may discharge only for cause." 
The Appellant in the instant case alleged in her 
complaint and before the Court evidence that she had oral 
assurances that as long as her work was satisfactori ly performed 
she would continue to be employed. The order grant ing summary 
judgment denies her the r ight to place this evidence before the 
Court . 
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SECOND DOCTRINE 
The second doctrine enables an employee to recover 
for breach of contract when the employer has violated a "covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing" implied in all contracts as a matter 
of law. 
Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts says: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." 
This concept has been used by several courts to 
imply an employer obligation not discharge employees wrongfu l ly . 
This promise of employment tenure implied in law was applied in the 
Monge v . Beebe Rubber Co . , i n f ra , retal iatory dismissal because 
Plaintiff refused to "go out with employer"; Petermann v . 
Teamsters, i n f ra , employer coercing per jury ; Fortune v . National 
Cash Register Co. , 373 Mass 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977), ci t ing 
and basing decision on Restatement of Contracts 205; Gates v . Life 
of Montana Insurance Co. , 638 P2d 1063 (1982), employer obligated 
to follow policies in personnel handbook. 
The Appellant alleged a contract of tenure implied 
in law based on oral assurances and policies in the personnel 
manual. That she was required to work under conditions which did 
not meet the minimum safety standards as dictated by this state and 
was discharged while she was being compensated for same, does not 
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demonstrate to this author the good faith and fair dealing in 
performance and enforcement required by basic contract law. To 
be barred from presenting evidence addressed to these issues is 
surely a grievance this Court can redress. 
THIRD DOCTRINE 
Final ly, the th i rd doctrine which permits recovery 
is a recovery in to r t when the dismissal offends some identif iable 
public policy. 
Intentional to r t principles require a Plaint i f f , in 
order to recover, to show that a legally protected r ight of the 
Plaintif f was harmed by an act of the Defendant and the Defendant 
lacked just i f icat ion for i t . The new wrongful dismissal cause of 
action has expanded the range of to r t theories potentially available 
to dismissed employees. Unti l these new wrongful dismissal theories 
were accepted by the Court , the dismissed employees could recover 
in to r t only i f they could show their dismissal was accompanied by 
conduct or a state of mind suff icient to satisfy tradit ional tor t 
categories, such as intentional interference with contractual 
relations, Restatement (Second) of To r ts , Section 766, comment C 
(1979); intentional inf l ict ion of emotional d is t ress, Restatement 
(Second) of To r t s , Sections 46 and 47; fraudulent 
misrepresentations, Restatement (Second) of To r t s , Section 525; 
defamation, Restatement (Second) of To r t s , 558; or invasion of 
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pr ivacy, Restatement (Second) of To r t s , 652B, 652C, 652D, and 
652E. 
The most commonly accepted new theory is the 
public policy t o r t . In these cases employer conduct contravened 
public policy i f i t violated a statutory grant of r ights direct ly 
pert inent to the employment relat ionship, or activit ies aff irmatively 
protected by public pol icy, or for opposing employer conduct that 
contravenes public policy. For example, the employee was 
dismissed in violation of a statutory grant of r ights direct ly 
pert inent to the employment relat ionship, such as Montalvo v . 
Zamora, 7 Cal App 3d 69, 86 Cal Rptr 401, (1970), which implied a 
civi l action for retaliation against an employee for exercising his 
r ights under a minimum wage statute, or Nees v . Hocks, 272 Or 
210, 536 P2 512 (1975), dismissed in retaliation for serving on a 
j u r y ; or workman's retaliation for f i l ing workman's compensation 
claims. 
The f i rs t workman's compensation case was 
Frampton v . Central Indiana Gas Co . , 260 Ind 249, 297 NE 2d 425 
(1973). The Court held that employee r ights and employer duties 
contained in the state worker's compensation acts would be 
f rust rated i f employers could retaliate against employees for f i l ing 
claims. Thus, i t held a cause of action existed although the state 
statute provided no penalties either civ i l or criminal for retal iat ion. 
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In Sventko v . Kroger Co . , 69 Mich App 644, 245 
N.W. 2d 151 (1976), the Court held that public policy embodied in 
the statute would be undermined i f the employer were permitted to 
discourage them from realizing r ights created by statute; the Court 
thus reversed the tr ia l courts grant of summary judgment against 
the Plaintif f . 
To bar the Appellant from presenting evidence that 
she was engaging in activit ies aff irmatively protected by public 
pol icy, that is to say claiming benefits from the Industr ial 
Commission for a work-related i n ju ry , which act iv i ty provoked her 
discharge is to compound by judicial decree the contravention of 
public policy. 
Although the Defendant's primary argument is that 
the Pla int i f fs contract of employment was terminable at w i l l , the 
issue of whether or not the Pla in t i f fs inabi l i ty to perform due to 
illness granted a r ight to terminate should also be addressed. 
The Plaintiff was employed under a contract for a 
specific period of time and that contract was indefinitely renewable 
so long as the Plaintif f adequately performed. Termination is 
represented to have occurred in January by the Defendant, in the 
middle of the contract period although no blue slip was given at 
that time and the Pla in t i f fs employment benefits continued unt i l 
May, at which time the Plaintiff was given her termination papers. 
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The Plaintiff 's in jury was cured by the time she was terminated 
and, t hus , the argument that her extended inabil i ty would have 
precluded her performance, at the time of actual termination, is an 
error in the law and in fact. 
There are genuine disputes of fact before the 
Court . The Plaintiff denies she was terminated in January. The 
documentary evidence shows that she was, in fact , not terminated 
in January, but in May. The fai lure to offer her a renewal of her 
contract , when she was physically able and wil l ing to do so, merely 
because the School Board Superintendent thought he had f i red her 
in January / is an administrative bumbling on the Defendant's side 
and cannot represent a prejudice to the Plaintif f . 
CONCLUSION 
The material issues of fact in this case are: what 
were the terms of Appellant's h i r i ng ; when did the School Board 
actually terminate Ms. Welch; and what were the school policies with 
respect to the renewal of contracts and termination of school bus 
dr ivers since they were not expl ic i t ly covered in all instances by 
the Policy and Procedures* Manual. There is a suff icient conflict in 
the pleadings fi led and in the representations of the evidence that 
the tr ia l court should be reversed in its grant of Summary 
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Judgment and the Appellant should be allowed to proceed on the 
merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Coffman S Coffman, P.C, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaint i f f , 
vs . 
GRAND COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant, 
C IV IL NO. 
VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
* 
NOW COMES your Plaint i f f and respectful ly 
represents unto this Honorable Court as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That at all times material , the Defendant Grand 
County School Distr ict employed educators and support personnel 
for the purpose of operating a school system in Grand County , 
Utah. 
2. That at all times mater ial , each employee in the 
Dis t r ic t was responsible to the Board of Education th rough its 
super in tendent , Bill B. Meador. 
3. That at all times material , the educators in and 
Dis t r ic t were represented by the G.E.A. Union and i ts 
representat ives negotiated on an annual basis, the terms of each 
year fs cont rac t . 
i\. That in August , 1981, Jolene L. Welch made 
application to the Grand County School Dis t r ic t for a position as 
bus d r i v e r . She was advised by Elmer E. Dravage, Business 
Manager of the Board of Education for the Grand County School 
D i s t r i c t , that bus d r i ve rs enjoyed the same negotiated benefi ts of 
employment that the educators had gained by negotiations wi th the 
exception of the number of days for sick leave. These benefits 
inc luded, bu t were not limited t o , l i fe insurance, d isabi l i ty 
insurance and vacation time. 
5. That at the time of her employment. Plaint i f f 
was advised that year ly contracts would be sent out each June 
which would state the wage and ref lect any changes. Plaint i f f 
understood that contracts would be tendered to her annually 
provided her work performance was sat is factory. 
6. Your Plaint i f f thereafter commenced to work for 
the Grand County School D is t r i c t , re ly ing upon the representations 
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of Elmer Dravage that the union contract in effect wi th the 
educators was the implied contract wi th the exception of sick leaves 
that covered the bus dr ivers and that as long as her job 
performance was satisfactory she could rely upon the job secur i ty . 
7. That in accordance wi th the standards of the 
Board of Education, your Plaintif f 's job performance was evaluated 
regu lar ly and she never received a negative evaluation. 
8. That at all times P la in t i f f s supervisors advised 
her tha t her employment was for an indef ini te term, the amount of 
the wage to be negotiated every June, and that her job performance 
was sat is factory . 
9. Tha t , pursuant to the direct ion of her 
immediate superv isor , your Plainti f f occasionally t ransported 
ch i ld ren wi th special educational needs. That the vehicle your 
Plaint i f f was instructed to use on September 2, 1983 did not comply 
wi th the minimun. ^ ^ . . ^ ^ . ^ ^ prescribed by the Utah Transportat ion 
Commission, which standards are promulgated by author i ty of 
Section 41-6-115 of the Utah Code Annotated, such standards being 
set f o r t h in the "Minimum Standards for Utah School Buses11 and 
"Utah School Bus Driver Handbook" as Chapters 30-43. 
That notwithstanding the lack of mechanical 
apparatus to l i f t a chi ld into a vehicle, in order to perform her job , 
the Pla int i f f l i f ted a chi ld into the vehicle on September 23, 1983. 
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That at the time of l i f t ing a handicapped chi ld wearing braces and 
in a wheelchair , she bore weight on her r igh t leg and turned to 
adjust the position of the ch i l d . At that t ime, your Plaint i f f 
sustained a back i n j u r y . 
10. That the State Insurance Fund, workman's 
compensation carr ier for the Grand County School D is t r i c t , 
compensated her for th is i n j u r y . 
11. That on January 6, 1984, your Plaint i f f called 
Superintendent Bil l B. Meador's office and was told that i f she d id 
not r e tu rn to work by the end of January she would be replaced. 
That at the time of th is conversat ion, your Plaint i f f was under a 
doctors care , had not been released for work , and was st i l l being 
compensated by the State Insurance Fund for a work-re lated i n j u r y . 
12. That on January 30, 1984, your Plaint i f f again 
talked w i th Superintendent Bil l B. Meador and was told that he was 
going to let her go. When Plaint i f f asked for a blue slip or some 
other indicat ion of terminat ion, he told her that he was going to 
hold her on the payrol l unt i l the end of May for insurance reasons. 
13. That on May 17, 1984, your Plaint i f f called Bil l 
Meador and told him the doctor would release her to re tu rn to work 
on or before August 2 1 , 1984. Mr. Meador told your Plaint i f f she 
d id not have a job , bu t refused to give her a blue slip) or any 
evidence of terminat ion. Subsequent ly, on the 29th day of June, 
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1984, your Plaint i f f received a letter stating her insurance was 
cancelled. 
14. That the Handbook of Selected Policies and 
Rules approved and adopted by the Grand County Board of 
Education, provides inter al ia, in 4119.1, for the order ly 
termination procedures without discr iminat ion. Your Plaint i f f had a 
wr i t ten contract of employment with the school d i s t r i c t , and based 
upon the representations to her of Elmer Dravage that 
non-educators were protected by these provis ions, she believes that 
she is ent i t led to the protection of these provis ions, to -w i t : (1) 
receiving a notice pr ior to the end of the contract , in wrf t ing of 
intent not to employ; (2) r igh t of a fair hearing concerning 
employment status or a r igh t to an informal conference. 
15. That your Plaint i f f believes that the date upon 
which her insurance was cancelled by the school d is t r i c t is the 
effect ive date of termination although she has made demand for a 
blue slip and has not received a blue slip or any other indication of 
terminat ion. 
16. That the Defendant has terminated the Plaint i f f 
cont rary to the policies and procedures of the Defendant and in 
violation of the implied contract the Defendant had wi th the support 
employees. 
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17. That the Defendant has wrongfu l ly discharged 
your Pla int i f f , and such a discharge is against public policy in that 
her absenteeism resulted from a job-related in jury for which 
workman's compensation benefits were paid throughout her period of 
absenteeism. 
18. That Plaint i f f , as a d i rect resul t of th is 
wrongfu l terminat ion, has sustained a loss of income, both present 
and f u t u r e , incur red expenses associated wi th a search for 
employment, suf fered a loss of pension benefits and other 
employment benef i ts , and has been damaged in other regards. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
19. That the Plaint i f f incorporates by reference, 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of her First 
Cause of Action as i f fu l ly set fo r th here in . 
20. That actions of the Defendant in terminating 
the P la in t i f f s employment as described above were outrageous and 
extreme, going beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be 
regarded as atrocious and u t te r l y intolerable in a civi l ized 
community. 
20. That the Defendant's actions were done 
intent ional ly and recklessly without regard for the r igh ts of the 
Plaint i f f . 
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21 . That as a direct result of the Defendant's 
outrageous conduct in terminating the Pla in t i f fs employment, the 
Plaint i f f sustained severe emotional d ist ress. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
22. That the Plaint i f f incorporates by reference 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 18 of the First 
Cause of Act ion and paragraphs 19-21 of the Second Cause of 
Ac t ion , as i f fu l l y set for th here in . 
23. That the actions of the Defendant in 
terminat ing the P la in t i f fs employment were attended by 
circumstances of f r aud , malice and a wanton or reckless disregard 
for the r i gh ts and feelings of the Plaint i f f , thereby ent i t l ing the 
Plaint i f f to reasonable exemplary damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaint i f f prays for Judgment against 
the Defendant for compensatory and exemplary damages as 
determined by the t r ier of fac t , for costs, interest from the date of 
terminat ion, exper t witness fees, deposition expenses, and such 
other and f u r t he r relief as the Court may deem proper . 
DATED this </ day of-Attgtret, A . D . 1984. 
Penelope D. COT f man 
Coffman & Coffman, P. C. 
At torneys for Plaint i f f 
Jolehe L. Welch 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Grand ) 
JOLENE L. WELCH the signer of the foregoing 
ins t rument , being f i rs t duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That she has read the above and foregoing 
instrument and knows the contents thereof; that the same is t rue to 
the best of her knowledge except as to matters therein stated on 
information and as to such matters, she believes i t to be t r ue . 
jr^L^ ^utM 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .day of 
t ' A . D . 1984. 
V^Sls/kL/ 
i ry Public 
Residing at Moab, Utah 84532 
My commission expires: 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone: (801) 259-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand 
County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, ANSWER 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
The above-named defendant, Grand County School District, 
answers plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a clap.m against this 
defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 
10 of plaintiff's Complaint, and admits that plaintiff was hired 
as a school bus driver for the school years 1980-1981, 1981-1982, 
1982-1983, and 1983-1984, and that plaintiff was not rehired as a 
school bus driver for the school year 1984—1985, admits that plain— 
tiff claims to have suffered an injury on the job in September 1983, 
and that the policies of the defendant provide for orderly termina-
tion procedures as to certain classifications of employees. Defen-
dant denies each and every other allegation of plaintiff's Complaint 
except as herein specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages as required by law, 
and to that extent is not herein permitted to recover. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
All acts or omissions of the defendant were undertaken in 
good faith, without malice, with probable cause, were fully justified 
and reasonable under the circumstances, and not in contravention of -
any recognized statutory, common-law or constitutional right of the ~ 
plaintiff. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has, and had, no recognized statutory, constitutional, 
or common-law right in, or expectancy relative to, continued employ-
ment by the defendant, and defendant specifically denies violating 
any recognized right, privilege or immunity, or any other statutory, 
constitutional, or common-law right of the plaintiff. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Defendant affirmatively alleges that plaintiff's employment 
with the School District was legally and properly terminated because 
of, inter alia, plaintiff's inability and/or unwillingness to perform 
the tasks reasonably attendant to said employment, all of same 
adverse to the defendant's rightful interests, and all acts of the 
defendant were consistent with the policies and procedures of the 
defendant and consistent with state and federal law. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that plaintiff herein claims damages for 
personal injuries sustained in connection with her employment with 
the defendant School District, same is barred by virtue of, inter 
alia, the exclusive remedy provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compen-
sation statute, Sections 35-1-60, et: seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953* 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that plaintiff's claims herein are based upon 
an alleged verbal or oral agreement or promise, same is void and 
unenforceable by virtue of the statute of frauds, Section 25-5-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint is defective as, contrary to Rule 9(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the circumstances constituting 
"fraud" as alleged in paragraph 23 thereof are not stated with 
particularity, and said claims should be dismissed. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with or to allege compliance 
with the provisions of, inter alia, Sections 63-30-11, 12, 13, 14, 
15 and 19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and this action is accordingly 
barred. 
-'*-
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Defendant is immune by virtue of, inter alia, the provisions 
of Sections 63-30-3, 4 and 10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
Defendant's maximum potential liability to plaintiff is the 
sum of $100,000.00, as provided by Section 63-30-34, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, nor may punitive or exemplary damages be recovered 
as against said defendant by virtue of Section 63-30-22, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Any injury or damage sustained by plaintiff was solely cause* 
or proximately contributed to by the negligence or other actionable 
conduct of the plaintiff, or by a risk of which the plaintiff knew 
or should have known and assumed, and said culpable conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff was equal to or greater than the culpable 
conduct, if any, of defendant. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
plaintiff's claims are barred, variously, by the doctrines 
of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, estoppel, failure 
of consideration, laches, statute of frauds, and''waiver. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered plaintiff's Complaint, 
defendant Grand County School District demands that same be dis-
missed and that it be awarded its costs herein incurred. 
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Dated this 17th day of January, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for (Defendant 
Grand County School District 
Received a copy of the above and foregoing Answer this 22nd day 
of January, A, D., 1985, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
59 East Center Street 
Moab, Utah 84532 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Ppst Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
P. O. Box 310 
Moab, UT 84532 
Telephone: (801) 529-5611 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Grand County School District 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOLENE L. WELCH, 
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Civil No. 5233 
Defendant. 
Defendant Grand County School District's Motion to Dismiss 
or in the Alternative, Motion for Sununary Judgment, a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in support thereof, together with an 
Affidavit, were filed by defendant's counsel of record in the 
above-referenced Court on the 13th day of May, 1985. Plaintiff 
filed no Objection to the Motion or Counter-Affidavits or 
Memorandum. 
The Court having reviewed, examined and considered the 
Pleadings, Affidavit and Memorandum on file, having previously 
t u n y in; V . I » » . J >»w _ , J i 
Filed (Q-lO-fiO _ 
Fee ^ • 
Barbara Domerfmto *^ ^y 
Clerk of Grand County * " 
issued a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, or for Summary Judgment, 
and being fully advised in the premises: 
The Court finds that plaintiff entered into an annual 
contract of employment with defendant Grand County School 
District covering the nine month period of the 1983-1984 school 
year as a bus driver; that plaintiff suffered an injury in 
September of 1983 and was unable to perform her employment 
under the contract; and, that it became necessary for 
defendant to replace plaintiff with another employee in January 
of 1984 to perform those duties. The Court concludes cis a 
matter of Law that the defendant Grand County School District 
was justified in terminating the employment of plaintiff for 
her inability to perform, and that the defendant is entitled 
to a Summary Judgment of No Cause of Action. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant Grand County 
School District's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, 
qranted. 
HATED this day of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Boyd Bunnell, District Court ^ m3g 
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